Yokoyama's Seminar Class at Kokugakuin University


Continuing Serious Concerns about the Situation at Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant in Japan (1)


Minoru Yokoyama

German version of this essay is published in Public Security-Helping Hands, 1-2012 (www.homeland-sec.de)

1. Information by Tokyo Electric Power on the situation at its Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant

@Tokyo Electric Power sought to construct more nuclear power plants under a plan to lift the supply of nuclear electric power from 30% to 50%. This was being promoted by the Japanese National Government.

@The Fukushima No 1 Nuclear Power Plant was hit by an unexpected large earthquake at 14:46 p.m. on March 11, 2011. Fortunately, three reactors stop generating electric power immediately after the earthquake by the emergency control system. Then, the uranium fuel rods were cooled for a while by water in their container vessels. It was hoped this would prevent explosions. However, after the Tsunami hit the plant at 15:27 p.m., they failed to continue supplying water under the Emergency Core Cooling System, as all electric power was lost in the plant. This caused uranium fuel rods to be exposed from their cooling water. These began to reheat and subsequently resulted in hydrogen explosions in the No. 1 reactor at 15:36 p.m. on March 12 and in the No. 3 reactor at 6:10 a.m. on March 15.

@Despite this increasingly serious situation, Tokyo Electric Power provided the Japanese Government, media and the public with only fragmentary information from the optimistic standpoint. Later the company was blamed by the estimation that many residents living near the plant might be bathed in radiation leaking at the time of the explosions owning to the lack of adequate information. It seemed that Tokyo Electric Power hesitated to offer the exact data in detail, because the company did not wish to de-commission the reactors at Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant while seeking to construct two new reactors at the campus in the near future.

@Given the exact information about the serious situation, the residents might change their supportive opinion about the plan to increase the nuclear reactors. Then, Tokyo Electric Power carefully avoided using words to express the serious situation. For example, at the press conference the company did not mention gthe explosion of a nuclear reactorh soon after the hydrogen explosions at their No. 1 and No. 3 reactors occurred. If the company had wanted to prevent peoplefs safety from leaking of radiation rather than to maintain and develop their economic activities, it should have published the exact information and taken the measures to cope with the accident from the pessimistic standpoint.

@We still have issues such as the true state of nuclear contamination in the surrounding land, sea and air as well as the persistent failure to control the reactions of rods in pressure vessels. It appears to have been under-reported about these issues. For example, Tokyo Electric Power should have realized possibility of the meltdown of the uranium fuel rods and the damage to the pressure vessels containing them. Instead the information provided was that the fuel rods were gpartially destroyedh. It was not until May 12 that Tokyo Electric Power admitted the possibility of meltdown of uranium fuel rods into the bottom of the No. 1 reactorfs pressure vessel. On May 24, Tokyo Electric Power reported, for the first time, the possibility of meltdown in their No. 2 and No. 3 reactors. Nevertheless, they hesitated to use the world of gmeltdown".

@The Japanese Government imposed mandatory evacuation orders for residents and businesses within a 30 km zone from the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. The Japanese government and people especially those evacuated, were angry with the delay in being provided precise information about the real serious situation. Continuing to provide information from an optimistic standpoint and delaying information on the true state of the situation at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant could be seen as a corporate crime in its widest meaning.

iPicture taken at Onahama Harbor, Fukushima, on April 21 after Tsunami on March 11, 2011j

2. What containment and stabilization measures could be undertaken?

@By the request of the Prime Minister of Japan, in the most serious situation the Self Defense Forces flew helicopters to fall down a small amount of sea water from air into the reactor. After this trial the Tokyo Fire Fighting Agency embarked on supplying water from 0:30 a.m. on March 19. They succeeded in dousing the No. 3 reactor with sea water through a hose. After their success, Tokyo Electric Power continues to cool down reactors using pure water sourced from outside its plant.

@As the situation has been stabilized, the possibility of further explosions of the uranium rods in the remaining damaged reactors has now reduced. However, serious nuclear contamination, especially in sea near the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, remains a continuing concern. Water used to cool the uranium rods is being contaminated by leaking radiation. Some of the irradiated water has leaked into sea and living things in the Pacific Ocean may now also be contaminated. We are afraid of eating not only vegetables and plants contaminated by the explosions but also fishes and plants living in the sea near the plant.

@To prevent further contamination, the construction of a water ecoffinf for No. 1 reactor was undertaken. However, it failed, when irradiated water leaked from the bottom of a container. As an alternate plan they are constructing a new facility to cool down the uranium fuel by the circulation of water. To stop the leaking of irradiated water into sea and underground, the construction should be completed as early as possible. Fortunately, on May 31 they succeeded in circulating water to cool down the uranium fuel at No. 2 reactor by the use of a new facility. We hope that the condition of uranium fuels in all damaged four nuclear reactors at Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant will be stabilized by next January to cool down the fuels gradually for long term according to the plan published by our government.

@Previously, Japan tried to develop robots in anticipation of a nuclear serious accident. The Japanese Government provided a budget of 3 billion yen to develop such robots after the nuclear accident at JOC in 1999. In 2001 six robots were made. However, the robots were de-commissioned in 2006, because electric power companies, including Tokyo Electric Power, refused to buy them. As a result, no robots made in Japan were ready to use at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. This lack of preparedness could be seen as a fault of Tokyo Electric Power. @To address its nuclear accident, Tokyo Electric Power has employed many unskilled laborers. They employed residents living near the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. The employees escaped from the plant immediately after the Tsunami. However, many of them returned to the plant to work, because Tokyo Electric Power offered these workers high wages. However, many persons working in the plant appear to have been exposed to radiation at over the prohibited levels, because Tokyo Electric Power did not check adequately employeesf health conditions soon after the explosions. Such exposure without severe health check is regarded as another fault of Tokyo Electric Power.

@The exposure of a lot of radiation has raised concerns for laborersf health and longevity. Premature death is thought for at least some of them. Nevertheless, Tokyo Electric Power continues recruiting many unskilled and semi-skilled persons to construct a facility for circulation of water to cool down the uranium fuel, to dispose of garbage contaminated by radiation, and to repair buildings and equipment at the plant.

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